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1 Introduction
National standard 9 of the Magnusun-Stevens Fisheries Management and Conservation Act requires
that U.S. Fisheries Management Plans minimize, to the extent practicable, bycatch and bycatch
mortality. Examination of U.S. fisheries suggest, however, that significant bycatch problems remain.
A recent National Bycatch Report (NMFS, 2011) estimates that 1,887 marine mammals, 11,772
endangered sea turtles and 7,769 sea birds were intercepted by fishing gear in 2005, the base year
of the study. Unintended bycatch and discard of non-target fish species is estimated at 1.22 billion
pounds, or 17% of the total 2005 U.S. catch. An approach often used by resource managers to
reduce bycatch of non-marketed but socially valuable marine species is to curtail fishing or regulate
fishing practices. Alternatives that allow the benefits from commercial and recreational fishing to
continue, while controlling unintended bycatch, are clearly preferred.
This paper studies the implications of controlling non-marketed bycatch with a system of tradeable
bycatch permits. Under such a cap-and-trade bycatch regulation, the fishery manager issues a fixed
number of permits each of which grants its owner the right to intercept a unit of the bycatch stock.
Permit prices provide incentives for fishermen to avoid bycatch. Providing incentives to avoid
bycatch offers an alternative to command-and-control regulations which seek to reduce bycatch
directly through costly spatial, temporal and depth fishing closures, reductions in fishing effort,
lowering of target stock harvest, and/or gear restrictions.
Our model features two key elements of the bycatch problem. First, fishermen employ a technology
that yields conditionally uncertain harvest of the target and bycatch species. Randomness arises
from unobserved absolute and relative abundance of the target and bycatch stocks in the sea.
Second, we assume fishermen can exert partial control over the mix of target and bycatch species
encountered by their gear; bycatch avoidance is a choice variable in our model. A weak output
disposable harvest technology is proposed under which reductions in bycatch involve reductions in
the harvest of the saleable target species. The model thus allows us to investigate the endogenous
bycatch-to-target harvesting decisions that arise in equilibrium under a quota-based regulation.
While these features have been introduced separately in earlier literature, combining both into a
single framework builds new insights for the design of quota-based bycatch management programs.
We derive and compare equilibrium harvests, landings, discards of the target and bycatch species,
permit prices and input costs under varying program designs including a scenario where at-sea
harvesting operations are fully observed by the fishery manager, and another where at-sea actions
are unobserved. The latter case describes most fisheries in the U.S. and worldwide due to the high
cost of placing observers on fishing vessels. While observability is a must for implementing bycatch
cap-and-trade, our analysis of the unobservable bycatch case provides a baseline for comparison
with non-quota-based management instruments such as effort reductions, area or seasonal closures,
and gear modifications, which can be implementable without observers.
We also examine the implications of permit trading restrictions, which may arise due to transac-
tions costs, e.g. thin bycatch cap markets, or regulatory prohibition. We show that management
performance generally deteriorates in the absence of trade. Without permit trade, the cost of
landing a given quantity of the target stock is higher, although bycatch may fall below the target
set by the manager. The intuition for the lower bycatch result is the following. In the absence
of post-harvest quota trade, any harvest overage of the target fish stock must be discarded, while
harvest uncertainty causes some fishermen to land less than their quota. In the aggregate, there is
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a larger input employment to land the same amount of fish. Costs rise and profitability declines.
The larger input allocation provides added maneuvering slack to further reduce bycatch. A reduc-
tion in bycatch in the no trade case, by no means, should be interpreted as an argument against
trade. Trade allows aggregate target quota and bycatch caps to be met. Therefore, if these targets
are optimally chosen, the equilibrium outcome under trade in quotas and bycatch permits is more
efficient.
As one would expect, our model also predicts that an observer program that can monitor and
enforce bycatch caps at sea, commands fishermen to employ inputs capable of harvesting their
target-stock quota while meeting bycatch limits. Placing observers on boats has its own costs. As
a result, while bycatch can be brought down to the desired level, harvesting costs will rise. An
observer program to cap bycatch at a socially optimal level has to thus balance bycatch reduction
benefits with its increased monitoring costs.
Cap-and-trade management is an alternative to non-quota-based regulations that attempt to reduce
bycatch through: (i) reductions in fishing effort and/or target stock harvest; (ii) closure policies
which limit access to the target stock at chosen times, depths, or in regions of the fishing ground
where the bycatch stock is believed to be concentrated; and (iii) fishing gear modification. These
regulations are popular in fisheries, possibly due to relatively low administrative costs of imple-
mentation, for example, by avoiding costly onboard observers. Empirical evidence of the effects
and costs of non-quota-based regulations in the Gulf of Mexico longline reef fish fishery, which we
provide as motivation for our study, suggests significant social costs in terms of forgone harvest
and fishing profits. While data limitations do not permit an exhaustive cost-benefit analysis of
competing bycatch management approaches, the evidence we provide suggests that quota-based
bycatch management warrants serious consideration by managers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the market-
based bycatch management literature. Section 2 presents an abbreviated case study of the Gulf of
Mexico longline reef fish fishery to highlight the costs of non-quota-based regulations and motivate
need for alternative (quota-based) bycatch management approaches. Section 3 introduces our
model. Results are derived in section 4. Conclusions and closing comments appear in section
5. An appendix to the paper, which is available from the authors on request, contains proofs of
key derivations, empirical examples, analysis under alternate model assumptions, and ancillary
empirical results.
1.1 Related literature
Efforts to reduce bycatch and discards of fish, birds and sea mammals have spawned a large liter-
ature in the fisheries sciences and economics.1 Bycatch management policy has generally followed
two somewhat independent paths. One focuses on modifying fishing gear to improve gear selectiv-
ity, i.e., designing gear to lower the quantity of bycatch intercepted per unit of harvested target
stock. Examples include turtle excluder devices on shrimp trawl nets, and circle hooks (as opposed
to traditional J-hooks) which tend to snag fewer sea turtles and cause less damage when turtles are
1We do not attempt a full review of this literature here. In addition to Gilman et al. (2006), see Lewison
and Crowder (2004), Pascoe et al. (2010) and references therein. Economists (e.g., Arnason (1994), Boyce (1996),
Turner (1995, 1997) and more recently Singh and Weninger (2009)) have examined economic trade-offs implicit in
multiple-species quota management programs and the associated bycatch problem. See Hutton et al., (2010) for a
review.
3
hooked. Gilman et. al. (2006) summarizes the state of knowledge regarding sea turtle avoidance
technologies. A second path, one followed in this paper, seeks to design regulations that provide
fishermen with incentives to undertake costly bycatch avoidance.
Fishermen make many production decisions that can influence the mix of species intercepted by
their gear, e.g., choice of fishing time, fishing depth and location, gear and bait combinations, net
mesh sizes, duration of soak times for baited hooks, use of sonar equipment which can increase
awareness of species vulnerable to capture (see Branch and Hilborn (2008) for empirical evidence).
Bycatch avoidance is privately costly and therefore providing incentives to incur avoidance costs
can be an effective management tool (Bisack and Sutinen (2006); Segerson (2011); Muhkerjee and
Segerson (2011); Pascoe et. al, (2010)). Economic incentives for bycatch avoidance in cap-and-
trade management programs, as we show, depend crucially on fish quota and bycatch permit prices.
A key novelty of our approach is that we investigate an explicit harvest-bycatch technology that,
within an equilibrium framework, allows us to study the properties of endogenously determined
fish quota and harvest bycatch permit prices, and their role in shaping fishermen’s harvesting and
bycatch avoidance behavior. As a result, our framework enables a quantitative evaluation of the
ecological and economic outcomes expected under a target/bycacth species quota/cap regulation.
Our paper most closely relates recent work by Segerson (2011) and Holland (2010).2 Segerson
(2011) presents a model of costly bycatch avoidance to study social efficiency under various bycatch
management policies, including taxes on the harvest of target and bycatch stocks, limits on allocated
effort, and penalties or fines levied when a bycatch limit is exceeded. In her model, the harvest
of the target stock is deterministic, and bycatch encounters are random. Segerson (2011) finds
that taxes, fines and caps placed on the bycatch stock at the individual fisherman level can lead to
socially efficient bycatch avoidance, whereas similar measures imposed on target stock generally do
not achieve efficient outcomes. To induce efficient bycatch avoidance, Segerson (2011) suggests an
industry-wide bycatch quota with a proportional penalty/reward that is paid by/to all members
when the group limit exceeds/falls below the management target. Segerson (2011) does not evaluate
a cap-and-trade bycatch policy at the industry level, and does not consider the implications of
unobservable bycatch. Our work contributes to the bycatch literature in these two respects.
Holland (2010) studies the impacts of individual bycatch quotas in a model of fishing uncertainty,
with a focus on the role of risk aversion in bycatch voidance behaviors. Holland (2010) simulates
bycatch, quota prices and fishing profit distributions numerically under competing assumptions for
risk preferences, randomness in production, and quota pooling arrangements adopted by fishermen.
Holland (2010) argues that quota pooling arrangements used in the British Columbia groundfish
trawl fishery reduce risk exposure and inefficiencies that would otherwise arise due to thin quota
markets. Holland (2010) assumes for simplicity that bycatch encounters are purely random, ac-
knowledging however that in reality fishermen affect bycatch by changing when, where and how they
fish, and the gear they use (Holland, 2010, p. 123).3 Our model extends the work of Holland (2010)
by incorporating endogenous bycatch avoidance in a quota/permit market equilibrium framework.
2Earlier work by Boyce (1996) develops a stylized model of the fisheries bycatch problem to address issues related
to the allocation of a fixed bycatch allowance across multiple users, and conditions under which individual transfer-
able bycatch quotas can replicate socially optimal outcomes. In the Boyce (1996) model, the quantity of bycatch
intercepted by fishermen is given exogenously as an fixed (perhaps increasing) proportions of harvest; endogenous
bycatch avoidance is not considered.
3A few studies have attempted to measure the cost of sea turtle bycatch management regulations. Curtis and Hicks
(2000) estimate the cost of closing portions of Hawaii’s pelagic longline fishing ground. Chakravorty and Nemoto
(2000), Huang and Leung (2007), and Pradhan and Leung (2005) apply various empirical techniques to estimate the
cost of reducing sea turtle bycatch in the same fishery.
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Quota-based bycatch policies have received increasing attention from managers and researchers
(Fisheries Leadership and Sustainability Forum (2009); Abbott and Wilen (2009); Holland (2010))
and warrant further analysis. Our contribution to the bycatch literature is manifold. We focus
on the role of markets in implementing aggregate target species and bycatch limits in a setting
of production uncertainty and endogenous bycatch avoidance. Importantly, we study equilibrium
outcomes including factor input allocation, harvest, avoidance efforts of fishermen, and bycatch
outcomes under target/bycatch quota-management. Finally, since unobservability is a fact of life
in most fisheries and quota/permit tradeability is often limited by market thinness or through
regulatory restriction we contrast equilibrium outcomes under these two phenomenon. Last, our
comparisons with non-quota-based regulations offers crucial insight for regulators and industry
faced, under the Magnusun-Stevens Fisheries Management and Conservation Act, with the task of
reducing bycatch.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. For concreteness we focus our analysis on the bycatch
of mega-fauna, and particularly sea turtles in longline fisheries. The next section reviews non-
quota based sea-turtle bycatch regulations in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico commercial reef fish fishery
and, to further motivate consideration of a quota-based bycatch management approach, provides
empirical evidence of the cost of these regulations. Section 3 introduces our model of a costly
and stochastic technology in a target- and bycatch-stock fishery. Section 4 analyzes equilibrium
landings, bycatch, and quota/cap prices in a quota-based management program, under trade and
no trade environments and with and without at-sea observability. Proofs and additional derivations
are presented in an appendix. Section 8 analyzes non-quota-based programs. Section 5 summarizes
our main findings and discusses directions for future research.
2 Bycatch management in the GOM commercial reef fish fishery
The Gulf of Mexico commercial reef fish fishery is a complex of mid-column and bottom-dwelling
species consisting of snappers, groupers, tilefish, amberjacks, triggerfishes, grunts, porgies, and a
host of others. Fishermen also harvest coastal pelagic species such as mackerel, dolphin, sharks and
tuna. Total landings in the fishery have ranged between 13.053-16.645 million pounds annually,
between 2005-09. Annual dockside revenue has varied between $36.884 -$43.227 million during the
same period.4
Two main gear types are employed in the commercial reef fish fishery. Vertical line gear is the most
common followed by longline gear (fish traps, nets and trolling gear are also used). Longline fishing
involves deploying a long cable with as many as 2,000 smaller ganion lines, each containing a baited
hook, to the desired fishing depth. The gear is soaked from anywhere between 2-10 hours. It is
then retrieved with a hydraulic winch. Captured reef fish are removed from the hooks, eviscerated,
and placed on ice for transport back to port.5
Loggerhead turtles (Caretta caretta) are the main turtle species intercepted by longline fishermen,
4In 2010, commercial fishing in the Gulf of Mexico was impacted by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster, which
led to spatial closures and significant disruptions to commercial fishing activity. We do not report data for 2010 as
it likely does not reflect normal fishing activity. Our data do not include a complete record on 2011 fishing activity.
All dollar values are reported in 2011 dollars.
5Fishing with vertical line gear involves lowering multiple baited hooks on vertical main lines off the side of the
vessel. When reef fish are captured, the line is retrieved, fish are removed from hooks, eviscerated, and placed on ice
for transport back to port. Turtle encounters are not considered a problem with vertical line gear.
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although gear interactions with Kemp’s Ridleys (Lepidochelys kempii) and leatherbacks turtles
(Dermochelys coriacea) may also occur. Turtles can become entangled in the longline ganion or
hooked as they pursue the same feed used as reef fish bait. Entangled turtles may drown or be
seriously injured and die. Turtle encounters with vertical line gear are virtually non-existent due to
the very short soak time; once a boat is on fish, baited hooks can be lowered and retrieved quickly
with little opportunity to attract and entangle turtles.
An on-board observer study conducted by the National Marine Fisheries Service from July 2006-
2008 recorded turtle encounters on 17.6% of longline trips, and on 1.9% of sampled sets (see NMFS,
2009). Extrapolation to total longline effort allocated during the study period predicts that 861
sea-turtle encounters (95% confidence interval at 384-1,934) during the 20 month period. The
estimated turtle take exceeds permissible levels under the U.S. endangered species Act, requiring
the NMFS to take regulatory action to reduce the number of sea turtle encounters.6
In May 2008, the Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council enacted three emergency measures
to reduce sea-turtle bycatch. Longline fishermen were prohibited from setting gear shoreward of a
line approximating the 35 fathom contour eastward of the 85 degree, 30 minute longitude, across
most of the Florida Gulf coast. Second, longline fishermen were permitted to carry no more that
1,000 hooks onboard their vessel, of which 750 could be rigged for fishing. Hook limits are intended
to limit the length of the longline, which effectively reduces soak time, a factor thought to be
positively related to sea turtle encounters and mortality. Lastly, managers limited the number of
vessels that were permitted to use longline gear. Amendment 31 was passed in May 26, 2010,
making made the emergency rules permanent.
Amendment 31 does not include provisions for on-board observers. The location of a fishing vessel
is tracked electronically with satellite-based global positioning technology which enforces depth
restrictions at relatively low cost. Likewise, the number of hooks on board and vessel permits can
be monitored at port thus avoiding the need and expense of onboard observers. Examination of
logbook records collected by the National Marine Fisheries Service suggests that Amendment 31
regulations have affected fishing practices and raised harvesting costs in the Gulf reef fish fishery.
2.0.1 Implications and cost of Amendment 31 regulations
Table 1: Longline Gear Effort, Landings and Revenue, 2006-10
Effort Landings (’000 lbs.) Revenue (’000 $)
Year Trips Vessels DAS All Spec. Red Grp. All Spec. Red Grp.
2005 2,028 170 12,908 7,508 3,085 $16,303 $8,974
2006 2,128 145 14,343 7,482 2,991 16,268 9,461
2007 1,362 134 12,068 4,968 1,938 13,835 6,456
2008 1,385 124 12,405 5,338 2,772 15,172 8,473
2009 793 105 7,690 3,214 1,084 8,713 3,242
Table 1 reports annual fishing effort, landings, and revenue for the Gulf longline fleet during the
6Sea turtles are listed as endangered under the Endangered Species ACT (ESA). By law, the National Marine
Fisheries Service must adopt fisheries regulations that are deemed not a threat to the existence of sea turtles.
Encounters during legal commercial fishing activities at or below levels that satisfy this requirement are permissible
under ESA law.
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2006-09 fishing seasons. We report landings and revenues for all reef fish species combined, and
for the longline fleet’s main target species, red grouper.7 Recall that longline bycatch management
regulations began in May 2008. The first full year of the regulation is 2009.
Table 1 reports that 19 fewer vessels fished with longline gear in 2009 than in 2008. This decline is
more pronounced if we consider dedicated longline gear boats. If we measure participants as vessels
that used longline gear on the majority of their annual trips, the longline fleet size dropped from
an average of 117 vessels in 2005-08, to 73 in 2009. Total longline gear trips declined from 1,385 in
2008 to 793 trips in 2009, a 42% drop. Landings and revenues also declined sharply in 2009. The
decline is most pronounced for red grouper where landings fell 39% and revenues fell 38% between
the 2008 and 2009 fishing seasons.
Logbook data provide evidence that reef fish fishermen switched gear types in response to Amend-
ment 31 regulations. The number of vertical line fishing trips increased by 749 in 2009, a 10%
increase over 2008 trips. Landings by vertical line gear (all species) increased by 17%, and vertical
line landings of red grouper increased by 21% between 2008 and 2009. Total landings for both gear
types fell 4.4% to 13.306 million pounds and total revenue declined by $4.53 million, or 11.1%, in
2009.
Table 2: Harvest Costs per landed pound (all reef fish species)
Longline Gear Vertical Line Gear
Trips Ave. Std. Med. Trips Ave. Std. Med.
2005 1,495 1.53 0.93 1.23 9,039 2.53 1.52 2.04
2006 1,409 1.74 0.97 1.47 8,570 2.63 1.55 2.14
2007 1,175 1.83 0.97 1.50 6,029 2.68 1.60 2.16
2008 1,209 1.66 1.02 1.33 6,086 2.51 1.51 2.03
2009 689 1.70 1.14 1.36 6,639 2.44 1.44 2.01
Table 2 reports summary statistics for fishing costs. Not all reef fishing trips record cost information,
which is why the number of trip observations is smaller than in Table 1.8
For longline gear, sample average cost per landed pound varies between $1.53-$1.83 in 2005-09. A
small increase in the average cost per pound is indicated in 2009 when bycatch regulations took
hold. The average cost per landed pound on vertical line gear trips is higher with a range of
$2.44-$2.68. Averaging across years, vertical line gear trips incur roughly $0.87 higher cost per
landed pound than longline gear trips. If we compare median values, vertical line gear costs are,
on average, $0.70 more per landed pound.
Information on revenues and costs reported in Table 2 suggest that regulations that reduce longline
gear fishing in the Gulf reef fish fishery are indeed costly. Reef fish fishermen are able to switch
gear types which offsets the losses from reductions in longline fishing. However, cost comparisons
across gear types suggest harvesting with vertical line is more costly. A few simple calculations
demonstrate.
7The majority of longline fishing takes place off the western Florida coast where red grouper is a prominent species.
8Trip costs include (1) expenses for fuel, bait, ice, and other miscellaneous expenses (from logbook data), (2)
payments to captain and crew labor, which we calculate as the estimated crew share times the trip revenue, and (3)
fixed operating expenses. Details for crew share calculations and fixed operating expenses are reported in Appendix
7.8.
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Total landed pounds by both gear types during 2005-2010 has remained fairly constant at roughly
13.6 million pounds per year. The average share of landings on longline vessels between 2006-08
was 0.415. The longline gear landings share dropped to 0.242 in 2009. Assume the longline share
of reef fish landings would have remained at 0.415 in 2009 had longline effort restrictions not been
imposed. Using the 2009 sample average cost per landed pound from Table 2, the fleet aggregate
costs would have been $1.70 million less. It should be noted that the data generating process
underlying Table 2 included depth restrictions and trip hook limits. The $1.70 million cost saving
can therefore be viewed as a lower bound.
3 The model
The harvest environment we have in mind is a single fishing season in which the stock size of the
target and bycatch species are given. Due to random fluctuation in the marine environment, e.g.,
changing weather, water temperatures, currents, and the distribution of feed, the relative mix of
the target and bycatch species varies.
We assume the number of fishermen is pre-determined and large. To simplify our analysis, we
assume a continuum of ex ante identical fishermen with a unit mass operate in the fishery.9 The
continuum assumption allows us to apply the law of large numbers, and scaling by unit mass lets
expected outcomes equal actual aggregate outcomes.
There are two stocks: a target species stock and a bycatch stock. For concreteness the target
species will be fish and the bycatch will be sea-turtles. Fish have consumptive use value and fetch
a positive unit price at the dock. Sea turtles have non-use value only. Harvesting operations are
conducted within a single production period. Individual fishing quotas grant their owners a right to
harvest a specified quantity of the target species during a fixed calendar period. Bycatch permits
legalize turtle encounters. In our model, the production period and fishing season coincide.10
Measures can be taken to avoid bycatch but these measures utilize resources. For example, shorter
soak times and fishing at night, which has been shown to reduce sea turtle encounters with longline
fishing likely requires additional labor. Sea-turtle interceptions with longline fishing gear is affected
by the type of hooks used, the type of bait, the depth and location of fishing, the length of time
baited hooks are soaked in the water, day versus night fishing (Gilman et al., 2006). We model the
cost of bycatch avoidance as reduced harvest and landings of fish for a given input allocation.11
To be precise, we assume fishermen choose a variable c which determines the point along a target-
bycatch transformation frontier at which production takes place. In particular, reducing bycatch
9The assumption of ex-ante homogenous fishermen is not necessary for the key results derived in this paper.
Allowing for heterogenous fishermen will unnecessarily complicate the model and add few new insights. In Appendix
7.4 we analyze the effect of area closures with heterogenous fishermen, where managers as well as fishermen have
perfect location-specific knowledge of the stock mix. We show that our results are qualitatively invariant to whether
agents are ex-ante or ex-post heterogenous.
10An alternate interpretation of our model is that the fishing season is divided into a finite number of production
periods. The analysis that follows would then apply to the final period in which the target species quota and bycatch
permits bind, and aggregate quotas/permits denote remaining, unfished quota/bycatch permits. Backward induction
could then be used to analyze avoidance behavior, quota prices, etc., in periods leading up to the final period. A
formal analysis of the multiple-production-period case is not attempted here.
11Segerson (2011) presents a model that is dual to ours; fishermen choose a costly action that lowers the probability
of intercepting sea turtles. In her model, increased avoidance raises costs and reduces the quantity of fish that is
harvested per gear set.
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by a proportion c from its natural baseline level reduces fish harvest by the proportion a(c). The
avoidance-augmented technology is expressed as
{hf , ht} =
{
zf (1− a(c))φ1−β, zt(1− c)(1− φ)1−β
}
nβ. (1)
We assume an increasing and strictly convex product transformation between the target and bycatch
species. In our framework, the marginal foregone fish harvest that results from a marginal reduction
in bycatch increases with additional avoidance. Formally, we assume a(0) = 0; a(1) ∈ (0, 1); a′,
a′′ ≥ 0 with strict inequality for c > 0; and a′(0) = 0, a′(1) = ∞. Thus, a(c) < c for all c. These
assumptions ensure the profit maximization problem is strictly concave in c. We allow c ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, a sufficiently high avoidance effort eliminates bycatch completely, while still yielding a positive
quantity of harvest.12
Figure 1: Relative stock abundance and harvesting technology. Figure depicts the avoidance aug-
mented technology under the assumption a(c) = 1−
√
1−c2
2 ; φ takes a low (φLOW ), medium ((φMED))
and high (φHIGH) value.
Figure 1 depicts the avoidance augmented technology. Maximum harvests of the target and bycatch
species for a common n is denoted A, B, and C in the figure for φ at a low, medium and high
values. All three harvest outcomes correspond to the case where no effort/input is spent on bycatch
avoidance, i.e., c = 0. If the fisherman chooses maximum avoidance, i.e., c = 1, bycatch is eliminated
but harvest of the target species is reduced to a fraction of its maximum value.
Harvesting uncertainty is introduced as follows. We assume that when input n is chosen, a fisherman
knows only the distribution of relative stock abundance, φ. Once at sea, actual realization of φ
12The technology could be parameterized as null-joint in outputs where zero bycatch is feasible only with zero
harvest of the target species.
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occurs, as fishing reveals stock conditions under the boat so to speak. Fishermen then choose
avoidance c to intercept their preferred quantities of fish and bycatch.
Our assumptions for uncertainty results in a choice problem that is solved in two stages. In the
first stage, input bundle n is chosen based on the known distribution of φ. We call this the planning
stage. The second operations stage begins once φ and the harvest possibilities are realized. It is
clear from (1) that a higher φ rotates the fish-bycatch frontier clockwise (see Figure 1). In what
follows, we let G(φ) and g(φ) denote the CDF and PDF of φ with a support [φmin, φmax], with
0 ≤ φmin < φmax ≤ 1, and xe ≡ E {x} ≡
∫
x g (φ) dφ denotes the expected value of a variable x.
We use H(n, φ) = {hf (n, φ), ht(n, φ)} to denote the harvest-bycatch possibilities frontier (HBPF).
For a given H(n, φ), input price, dockside fish price, and regulations limiting harvest and bycatch,
fishermen choose n in the planning stage to maximize expected profits (denoted by pie) and c in
the operations stage to obtain their desired harvest/bycatch mix on the HBPF.
A few words about the model set up are warranted. Uncertainty in relative abundance generates
a stock-mix realization in which some lucky fishermen realize a high target to bycatch stock mix;
unlucky fishermen realize the opposite. This generates a natural environment for trade in fish quotas
and bycatch caps: the lucky ones will wish to buy more fish quotas while the unlucky will seek
more of turtle permits. Having a single parameter φ as opposed to two separate stock uncertainty
parameters simplifies the analysis. Uncertainty is idiosyncratic in our model. Uncertainty in the
aggregate stock levels is important for setting fishery-wide targets and quantitative evaluation of
alternative regulatory regimes, however, here our focus is on bycatch avoidance behavior under
quota- and non-quota based regulations. Aggregate uncertainty in quota managed fisheries is
examined in Singh and Weninger (2012).
Alternate assumptions could be made regarding the timing of input choices and realization of
uncertainty. In an Appendix 7.3) we assume stock conditions φ are revealed before the input
bundle is chosen. This case is equivalent to assuming that inputs are perfectly reversible. Our
model assumes the planning stage input choice is irreversible. As example, a fisherman organizes
crew, bait fuel, etc. based on expectation of stock conditions. Trip capital, labor, fuel and bait
has been committed and the challenge is to organize the input bundle to optimize trip revenues.
While the full irreversibility assumption may be somewhat extreme, it captures the essence of input
choice under uncertain production. Nonetheless, we take care throughout our analysis to indicate
where results can change when the irreversibility assumption is relaxed.
A second scenario models the production decision as a one-shot event in which n and c are both
chosen prior to the random harvest/bycatch realization (e.g, Segerson, 2007). Our model features
endogenous bycatch avoidance combined with harvest uncertainty. A one-shot model would require
that we take a stand on the proportion of bycatch caused by pure randomness versus the proportion
caused by avoidance actions and the results would depend on this choice (see Abbott, 2007). Adding
pure randomness to catch outcomes would require specification of penalties in the event of quota
overages. This would introduce behavioral incentives different from those that arise from buying
and selling quota in a decentralized quota- and bycatch-cap fishery. It is the latter incentives that
is of interest in this paper. For this reason, there is no unintended bycatch in the operations stage
of our model. In effect, we assume that all bycatch can be avoided at a sufficiently high cost.
This assumption may be reasonable for longline gear where fishermen have several options to avoid
turtles (Gilman, et al. 2006).
Finally, we assume the fishery manager has accounted for the social costs/benefits when setting
10
the target fish stock quota and quantity of turtle bycatch permits. In fact, these choices depend on
harvesting costs which we show vary with the form of the regulation. Determination of the jointly
socially optimal fish quota and turtle bycatch cap is reserved for future work.
4 Cap-and-trade bycatch management
We now consider the implications of our costly bycatch avoidance model in a fishery that is managed
with individual quotas for the target fish stock, and permits for turtle bycatch, denoted in the model
as qf and qt, respectively. Corresponding quota/cap prices are denoted by rf and rt. We begin
with a case where at-sea fishing activity is unobserved by the manager. This scenario approximates
a regulation with no effective controls on harvest of the bycatch stock, and thus no incentive to
undertake costly bycatch avoidance. Analysis of the case where at-sea fishing activity is observable
is discussed later. In each case, we contrast scenarios where quota is and is not tradeable.
4.1 Quota-based management without at-sea observability
Assume dockside landings are monitored but at-sea fishing operations are unobserved by the regula-
tor. We assume the fishermen’s objective is to maximize private fishing profits. Fishermen harvest
no more than their quotas, even if it is feasible to do so. Furthermore, while sea-turtle bycatch is
socially undesirable, and fishermen will take necessary measures to avoid it, minimizing bycatch
yet remains a secondary objective.13 Thus if in the operations stage the realized HBPF permits
full utilization of quotas, we assume fishermen choose a {hf , ht} pair that obtains the lowest turtle
bycatch. For example, suppose a fisherman realizes the HBPF depicted in Figure 2 below. If his
quota and bycatch cap is {qf , qt}, harvest will be at point A, and both fish quota and turtle bycatch
cap will be met. On the other hand, if his quota is
{
q′f , qt
}
at point B, he will harvest q′f and
ignore (and violate) his turtle bycatch cap by harvesting at point C because the bycatch overage
is unobservable.
4.1.1 Fish harvest and bycatch under trade in quotas
Suppose fish quotas are traded in fully functional quota markets. We focus on fish quotas that have
a positive price, i.e., rf > 0. This requires that all the quota supplied, qf , is bought and the quota
binds in equilibrium. Since quotas can be traded both before and after the HBPF is realized, by
invoking arbitrage we assume that the same price prevails in both sub-periods.
At the planning stage, a fisherman anticipates his operations stage choices, contingent on the
realized random stock, to be rationally optimal. With this sequence in mind, we can solve for the
equilibrium fish harvests and turtle bycatch by applying backward induction.
The operations stage Without at-sea observability of fishermen’s actions, any cap on sea-turtle
bycatch is meaningless. Effectively, the price of turtle by-catch is zero, and a fisherman’s optimal
13Sea turtle bycatch management policies exist because set turtles have non-consumptive social value. Fishermens’
non-consumptive values have been ignored to simplify our analysis.
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Figure 2: Harvest choices for different fish quotas and bycatch caps.
choice will be to maximize revenues from fish harvest. Let the dockside price of fish be pf . As
long as the quota price satisfies rf < pf , a fisherman will not incur any avoidance costs and choose
c = 0 to maximize fish harvest.14 This is shown as point D in Figure 2 above.
Suppose fish quota bought by all ex-ante identical fisherman is qf as shown in Figure 1. Then a
fisherman with a realization of φMed simply harvests at point B with zf (φMed)
1−βnβ = qf , and
does not enter the quota market. The fisherman with φHigh on the other hand can harvest more
than his quota, and as rf < pf , will buy additional quota from a fisherman with realization such
as φLow, e.g., at point A. The equilibrium quota price rf , by arbitrage, equals its market price at
the planning stage.
The planning stage At the planning stage, fishermen choose inputs n, keeping in mind their
optimal operational responses to all possible realizations of φ. They know their harvest will be a
pair given by (1), i.e., the frontier points represented by A−B−C in Figure 1. The problem then
is to choose n and qf to maximize expected profit:
pie = (pf − rf )E
[
φ1−β
]
· zf nβ − w n,
14With no aggregate uncertainty, rf ∈ (0, pf ) holds. Under aggregate uncertainty ex-ante and ex-post quota prices
will be different. Also, if ex-post harvest turns out to be sufficiently high, there may be an excess demand for quotas
driving rf = pf . In such cases, discard will also occur.
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where w is the per unit price of the input and E is the expectations operator.15 An interior choice
of n solves
β(pf − rf )E
[
φ1−β
]
· zf nβ−1 = w. (2)
Thus, inputs are employed to equate the value of their marginal product (LHS) with their marginal
factor cost (RHS). In equilibrium, rf is determined from the above and the quota market clearing
condition:
E
[
φ1−β
]
· zf nβ = qf . (3)
Notice that the assumption of unit mass, ex-ante homogeneity, and i.i.d. realizations of φ across
fishermen, equates the expected with the aggregate harvest (LHS). The first two assumptions also
imply that the aggregate quota in the market equals that held by an individual. To economize on
notation, this feature will be repeatedly exploited in the rest of the paper.
By combining (2) and (3), the quota price can be expressed as
rf = pf (1− wn
βpfqf
).
The quota price can be interpreted as per unit market earnings, net of its utilization costs. The
term wnβpf qf is the ratio of cost of inputs in its share of dockside market earnings. If fishermen are
not quota-constrained, this share equals unity and no rents accrue to the holder of quota rights.
If constrained, a lower constrained-optimal input employment implies that its share of dockside
earnings exceeds its costs, and the rents are positive.
Turtle bycatch Bycatch is governed by fishermen’s choices as dictated by (2) and (3). The
aggregate bycatch is
het =
zt
zf
E
[
(1− φ)1−β
]
E [φ1−β]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡τ
qf = τ qf . (4)
The higher the fish quota, the higher is the quantity of inputs employed, which leads to a higher
bycatch of turtles. Bycatch also depends on the mean relative abundance of fish in the water. A
higher average φ implies that the expectation term is lower. A higher average relative abundance
of fish naturally leads to a lower bycatch.
Thus, in a fishery with unobservable bycatch and tradable fish quotas, sea-turtle bycatch is directly
determined by the aggregate fish quota. In order to restrict sea-turtle encounter/mortality to a
desired level, the manager has a single regulatory instrument available, qf . The social cost of
15For completeness, the profit function should be written as
Π = E
(
pf φ
1−β · zf nβ + r′f
(
qf − φ1−β · zf nβ
))
− w n− rfqf ,
where rf and r
′
f denote quota prices in the pre- and post-harvest markets. This essentially yields the arbitrage
condition rf = r
′
f and allows profit to be expressed as above.
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reducing bycatch mortality in this setting is the foregone net profits from harvesting the target
stock.
4.1.2 Fish harvest and bycatch without trade in quotas
While fishermen are assumed ex-ante homogeneous, a rationale for trade exists as fishermen’s
harvest possibilities diverge in the operations stage when stock conditions are realized. Without
trade, however, a fisherman can not purchase additional quota to land any harvests that exceed
quotas purchased in the planning stage. We refer to Figure 1 again for illustration. Let the
fish quota holding of all fishermen be qf . Then, all fishermen with harvest realizations φLow will
land their maximum possible harvest, whereas a fisherman realizing φHigh will hold excess quota;
qf > zf φ
1−βnβ. These fishermen are landing-constrained. We next compute equilibrium fish
harvest and sea-turtle bycatch when no quota trading occurs in the operations stage.
The operations stage In the absence of operations-stage quota trades, fish harvest (and land-
ings) will follow,
hf =
{
zfφ
1−βnβ, if φ < φ¯ ≡ ( qf
zfnβ
)
1
1−β
qf , if φ ≥ φ¯
. (5)
The planning stage Given operations-stage harvests in (5), the problem at the planning stage
is to maximize expected profit:
pie = pf
[∫ φ¯
φmin
zfφ
1−βnβdG(φ) + qf
∫ φmax
φ¯
dG(φ)
]
− wn.
The first integrand represents harvests that fall below quota, while the second integrand captures
stock realizations where landings are constrained by quota. The optimal input choice equates the
marginal input cost with its marginal value product:
β pf
∫ φ¯
φmin
zfφ
1−βnβ−1dG(φ) = w. (6)
Comparing necessary conditions (6) and (2) indicates two differences. First, the marginal value of
an incremental harvest under quota trade is (pf − rf ) since each unharvested unit can be traded in
the quota market at price rf , whereas marginal value is pf in the absence of quota trade. Second,
a marginal unit of harvest (at its maximum feasible) is useless if φ > φ¯, since without quota trade
the overage cannot be landed. Hence, the expectation under (6) is truncated at φ¯.
Expected fish harvest With non-tradable quotas, aggregate fish harvest falls below the aggre-
gate quota since some quota is unutilized. Expected fish harvest follows from (5):
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hef = qf (1−G(φ¯)) +
∫ φ¯
φmin
zfφ
1−βnβdG(φ) < qf , (7)
where n is determined from (6). The first term denotes the constrained harvest qf weighted by the
probability of being quota constrained. The second term accounts for all harvests that fall below
the quota, which also explains the last inequality.
Turtle by-catch For relatively high fish abundance realizations, such that φ > φ¯, fishermen are
quota constrained and harvest below the maximum feasible (e.g., in Figure 2, points below and
left of D, such as C or A). In this case, the ex ante input allocation is ex post excessive in the
sense that the fish harvest capacity, zfφ
1−βnβ exceeds the quota holding. Without opportunity
to acquire additional fish quota, the shadow price of unused input is effectively zero. Under our
assumption of no unnecessary turtle bycatch, some turtle avoidance occurs. As fish harvest equals
qf , the choice of c at the operations stage is trivially determined from
qf = zf (1− a(c))φ1−βnβ. (8)
Aggregate bycatch then follows as (see Appendix 7.1):
het = ztn
β
[∫ φmax
φ¯
(1− c(φ))(1− φ)1−βdG(φ) +
∫ φ¯
φmin
(1− φ)1−βdG(φ)
]
, (9)
where c(φ) solves (8). The first bracketed term denotes bycatch with avoidance: these are the
fishermen who are quota constrained and can afford to reduce bycatch. The second term captures
those unconstrained fishermen who put all their inputs toward harvesting fish. In all the numerical
illustrations that follow, we assume a(c) = 1−
√
1−c2
2 which in the present case implies c(φ) =√
1− ( 2qf
zfφ1−βnβ
− 1)2 (see Appendix 7.1).
Recall that sea-turtle bycatch under quota trade equals ztn
βE
[
(1− φ)1−β]. Since c(φ) is positive,
the term within square brackets in (9) is less than this amount. If, in addition, n here is lower than
its quantity under quota trade (see (2) and (3)), bycatch is lower. Otherwise, whether bycatch is
higher or lower with quota trading is ambiguous.
A normative comparison of bycatch under the two environments is complicated by the fact that fish
harvest is lower without quota trade. A meaningful comparison therefore requires that aggregate
fish harvest and landing be kept the same under the two trading environments. One can then
examine whether trade leads to a lower or a higher turtle bycatch. To land the same amount of fish
with no quota trade, aggregate (and expected) harvest must be higher as some fishermen harvest
below their fish quota and divert inputs to reduce sea-turtle bycatch. Therefore, input employed
must be larger. We confirm this insight with a numerical example.
Figure 3 reports the percentage increase in input cost and the percentage reduction in sea-turtle
bycatch under no quota trade relative to their values under trade holding fish landings constant
across the two scenarios. As evident, bycatch is lower without trade in quotas. As discussed
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Figure 3: Cost increase and bycatch reduction under no trade scenario. Results assume φ uniformly
distributed on [0.7, 0.9] with w = pf = 1, zf = 2, zt = 0.1, β = 0.6 and qf = 1.
earlier, when quotas cannot be traded, fishermen employ a higher input quantity to obtain the
same expected fish landing. As evident, this raises input costs. But then fishermen who encounter
high fish abundance cannot direct all inputs to fish harvest as this would exceed their quota.
Unutilized inputs are directed to bycatch avoidance and bycatch is lower.
As is also evident, the increase in input cost and the decrease in bycatch diminish as landings
increase. The reason is simple. A higher landing target requires a higher quota allocation, which
due to diminishing returns implies a lower likelihood of a binding target-species quota constraint.
Trade becomes less relevant as the quota allocation moves towards its nonbinding threshold, and
the outcomes under two environments converge.
One key lesson drawn by comparing harvest and bycatch under trade vis-a`-vis no trade is that
under the latter, effort is expended to avoid bycatch, whereas under the former all effort is directed
towards harvesting fish. Trade raises the shadow cost of bycatch avoidance. It is then for the
manager to evaluate whether cost increases justify bycatch reduction. Prima facie, however, there
may be a rationale for restricting trade when bycatch is unobservable.
It is instructive to examine the conditions under which this result will and will not hold. First,
as noted above, when the input allocation is higher under the no-trade case and irreversible, the
opportunity cost of diverting unutilized n toward bycatch avoidance is zero. Bycatch is lowered
due to a good Samaritan effect where, all else equal, fishermen choose to avoid turtles. If quota is
tradable, the opportunity cost of diverting n to bycatch avoidance is positive, determined as the
productive value of the input in the harvest of fish that can be landed by purchasing additional
quota.
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The assumption that the planning-stage input allocation is irreversible is crucial for this result. If,
alternatively, unutilized inputs can be costlessly saved for future fishing endeavors, maximization
of fishing profits requires c = 0, and the harvest/bycatch ratio for a fisherman is increasing in the φ
realization, as given by
(
1
φ − 1
)1−β
. In this case, sea turtle bycatch is unambiguously higher when
quota cannot be traded relative to when it can be traded in the operations stage. Without trade,
all fishermen harvest their fish quotas. With trade, high (low) φ fishermen buy (sell) fish quotas
and harvest more (less) than qf . Since under trade a relatively larger quantity of fish is harvested
by high φ fishermen who incur lower bycatch per unit of target harvest, total bycatch is lower.
4.2 Quota-based management with at-sea observability
We now turn to the case where sea-turtle bycatch is monitored at sea. We assume the penalties
for violations are sufficiently high and fishermen, as a result, obey their bycatch cap by taking all
necessary avoidance measures.
If sea-turtle caps are sufficiently high, they do not bind in equilibrium. The choice problem, as under
the unobservable case studied above, is completely guided by fish harvests. On the other hand,
if the cap is sufficiently low but fish quotas are sufficiently high, the choice problem is governed
primarily by the turtle bycatch cap. Fish harvest management then becomes trivial. Therefore,
we focus here on the more interesting case where both fish quotas and bycatch caps bind in the
aggregate.
As above, we alternately study scenarios where fish quotas and bycatch permits are and are not
traded in the operations stage.
4.2.1 Fish harvest and bycatch under trade in quotas
We continue to assume that arbitrage equalizes quota/cap prices across the planning and operations
stage since there is no aggregate uncertainty.
The operations stage The fisherman’s problem is to maximize profits by balancing fish harvest
with turtle bycatch:
pi(φ) = max
c


(pf − rf )zf φ1−β(1− a(c))︸ ︷︷ ︸
hf (φ)
−rtzt(1− φ)1−β(1− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ht(φ)
 nβ − w n+ rfqf + rtqt
 . (10)
With at-sea observability bycatch must be matched with permit holdings which trade at price rt.
An optimal and interior choice of c, contingent on φ, is then
a′(c) =
rt
pf − rf
zt
zf
(
1
φ
− 1)1−β. (11)
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Under our assumption φ ∈ (0, 1) the term within brackets is finite. Also, for positive harvests to
take place, rf < pf . Finally, for all qt > 0, the equilibrium bycatch price rt < ∞. Thus, a′(c) is
finite, and it is positive when rt > 0.
Recall that a′′ > 0, which implies that c is increasing in rt, rf , and decreasing in pf .16 Thus, the
higher is the bycatch permit price, the higher is the bycatch avoidance. Conversely, the higher the
marginal revenue from fish harvest, the lower is the bycatch avoidance. When rt > 0, we have c > 0
for all φ < 1. Thus, no fisherman harvests (or lands) his maximum feasible harvest of fish.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimum harvest and bycatch combinations at points A, B, and C for
φ realizations of φLow, φMed and φHigh, respectively, when the quota held by all fishermen is at
{qf , qt}. Equation (11) also indicates that c is decreasing in φ. Thus, a fisherman who encounters
a relatively high concentration of fish directs little effort to avoid sea-turtles. The opposite is the
case for fishermen who encounter a relatively high concentration of turtles. The above logic also
implies that fishermen with relatively higher fish encounters will buy additional fish quotas and sell
turtle bycatch permits, while those with lower fish encounters will do the opposite.
The planning stage We have assumed that all quotas are binding; i.e., no quota or bycatch
permit goes unutilized. As harvest and bycatch can not exceed their respective limits, it must be
the case that
hef = qf = n
βzfEφ
{
φ1−β [1− a(c˜(φ))]
}
; (12a)
het = qt = n
βztEφ
{
(1− φ)1−β(1− c˜(φ))
}
, (12b)
where c˜(.) : φ→ (0, 1) is implicitly defined by (11).
The optimal input choice is obtained by maximizing the expected profit:
pie = Eφ
[
(pf − rf )zf φ1−β [1− a(c˜(φ))]
−rtzt(1− φ)1−β(1− c˜(φ))
]
· nβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(pf−rf )qf−rtqt
− w n,
which calls for an input quantity that satisfies
wn = β [(pf − rf )qf − rtqt] . (13)
Input payments (left-hand side) equal their share (β) in revenues, as is standard with Cobb-Douglas
production functions.
It is worth reiterating that rf and rt are endogenously determined. Thus, equations (12a), (12b),
and (13) jointly determine n, rf and rt.
16For example, when a(c) =
1−
√
1−c2
2
, the above gets
c˜(φ) =
√
1
1 + 4( rtzt
(pf−rf )zf (
1−φ
φ
)1−β)−2
.
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Fish discards and turtle by-catch As evident from (12a), there are no fish discards. Further-
more, turtle bycatch in (12b) is exactly as planned by the manager. Those fishermen who exceed
their individual bycatch cap trade from others; in aggregate, sea-turtle bycatch exactly matches
the cap qt. This result is noteworthy. Recall that bycatch permit sales and purchases determine
its equilibrium price at the operations stage. These prices are known in advance (and also prevail)
at the planning stage because there is no aggregate uncertainty. These prices in turn determine
input employment, which in equilibrium has to be consistent with demand (purchases) and supply
(sales) of bycatch permits at the operations stage.
It is worth comparing the costs and benefits with and without at-sea observability. We have shown
that trade in fish quotas ensures that fish landing exactly matches its quota, whether bycatch is
observable or not. However, when bycatch is unobservable, its quantity is proportional to the
fish quota. The manager cannot set fish quotas and turtle caps independently, whereas under
observability this will be the case. From (12a) and (12b) we see that the quantity of bycatch per
unit of fish harvest will be greater when at-sea behavior is unobserved:
het
hef
=
Eφ
{
(1− φ)1−β(1− c˜(φ))}
Eφ {φ1−β [1− a(c˜(φ))]}
zt
zf
<
Eφ
{
(1− φ)1−β}
Eφ {φ1−β}
zt
zf
= τ ,
where τ is as in (4). A lower observable bycatch requires fishermen to incur avoidance costs, and
c˜(φ) > 0 for all φ. The inequality follows from the assumption that a(c) < c for all c.
While an observer program can implement a particular bycatch quantity, the cost of landing the
same fish quantity without observability is larger by a factor (Eφ
{
φ1−β
}
/Eφ
{
φ1−β [1− a(c˜(φ))]}) 1β .
The cost of deputing observers on boats needs to be accounted for further. The bottom line once
again is that bycatch reduction comes at a cost.
4.2.2 Fish harvest and bycatch without trade in quotas or bycatch permits
Now suppose that fishermen cannot trade fish quota or bycatch permits and, due to observability,
their harvest/bycatch can not exceed their quotas/permits.
The operations stage The quantity of input and ex-post HBPFs will depend on the fish quota
and bycatch cap {qf , qt} relative to prices. If the marginal return to the input is high, i.e., {qf , qt}
are sufficiently small for given p/w, fishermen will have chosen a relatively large n in the planning
stage. In this case, quotas and bycatch permits will likely lie in the interior of realized HBPFs. Point
A in Figure 4 with quota/permits {qf , qt} represents this case. On the other hand, quota/permit
caps are sufficiently large for given p/w, the HBPF may fall outside the envelope of zero-avoidance
points. This allows for a quota/cap point like B with quota/permits
{
q′f , q
′
t
}
in Figure 4.
Below, we present the case where quota/permits are at point like A in Figure 4. A detailed analysis
of equilibrium for points such as B is provided in Appendix 7.7.
As evident, if a fisherman holding {qf , qt} in Figure 4 realizes φˆ, he precisely meets his targets by
harvesting at point A. If his realized φ is above say at φ, he can meet his fish target and also
observe his bycatch cap by catching fewer turtles than qt. On the other hand, if his φ = φ, he can
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Figure 4: Observable harvests and bycatch under no quota trade.
not fully utilize his fish quota since doing so will violate his bycatch cap. He must sacrifice fish
harvest by diverting effort to bycatch avoidance. This argument leads to the following harvesting
rules that implicitly determine a fisherman’s avoidance efforts, c:
hf = zf (1− a(c))φ1−βnβ = qf for all φ ≥ φˆ; (14a)
ht = zt(1− c)(1− φ)1−βnβ = qt for all φ ≤ φˆ. (14b)
Thus, while (14a) determines c as a function of φ, n, and qf , (14b) determines c as a function of φ,
n, and qt. Let these functions be denoted as cˆf (φ, qf , n) and cˆt(φ, qt, n) respectively. This in turn
obtains
ht = hˆt(qf , φ, n) ≡ zt(1− cˆf (φ, qf , n))(1− φ)1−βnβ, φ ≥ φˆ; (15a)
hf = hˆf (qt, φ, n) ≡ zf (1− a(cˆt(φ, qt, n)))φ1−βnβ, φ ≤ φˆ. (15b)
Thus, (14a) - (15b) completely characterize harvests and bycatches when {qf , qt} is sufficiently
tight.
The planning stage Using (15a) and (15b), the expected (and aggregate) fish harvest and
sea-turtle bycatch are derived as
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hef = qf
(
1−G
(
φˆ
))
+
∫ φˆ
φmin
hˆf (qt, φ, n) dG (φ) ; (16a)
het = qtG
(
φˆ
)
+
∫ φmax
φˆ
hˆt (qf , φ, n) dG (φ) . (16b)
Since quotas/caps can not be traded, the optimal choice of input simply maximizes pfh
e
f−wn, where
hef as expressed by (16a) internalizes the harvest/bycatch quota/cap constraints (see Appendix 7.5):
w = βpf
∫ φˆ
φmin
zf
(
1− a (cˆt (φ, qt, n))− (1− cˆt (φ, qt, n)) a′ (cˆt (φ, qt, n))
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
φ1−βnβ−1dG (φ) . (17)
It is instructive to compare the above with its counterpart under unobservable bycatch, equation
(6). Under both cases, landing is observable and fishermen do not harvest more than their fish
quotas. Landing is quota-constrained when relative fish abundance exceeds a threshold. Suppose
the thresholds turn out to be identical under both cases. Then by (17) inputs employed under
observability must be less than that under no observability. This is intuitive: a marginal unit of
input not only increases harvest but also by-catch and the latter is costly under observability. This
discourages input employment. Expected/aggregate harvest under observability is lower as a result.
Recall that with unobservable at-sea behavior, equilibrium bycatch is lower with no trade vis-a`-vis
trade, although the reduction comes at a higher cost. Does a similar contrast exist when bycatch
is observable? We examine this through a numerical example.
Observable bycatch without quota trade: Without trade in quotas and bycatch caps, the
equilibrium is governed by (14a) – (17). We solve for the equilibrium and contrast costs and bycatch
for varying landings targets under the two environments. The results are reported in Figure 5.
Qualitatively, Figure 5 is similar to that exhibited in Figure 3, which reported outcomes with no
at-sea observability. Without trade, fishermen employ higher input quantities to land the same
quantity of fish, which raises costs. With more inputs and a lower opportunity cost of allocating
the inputs to avoidance under no trade, bycatch is smaller. As quotas/landings become larger for
given prices, the role of trade diminishes and the differences in outcomes diminishes.
It bears emphasis that under observability and quota/bycatch cap trade, any {qf , qt} chosen by the
manager is implementable. This is not possible in the absence of trade. The upshot here is that
trade in quotas and caps welfare dominates the absence of trade, when bycatch is observable.
Once again, the result that bycatch is relatively lower without quota trade hinges on the assumption
of input irreversibility. In Appendix 7.3, we show that with input reversibility, quota trade instead
leads to a lower bycatch. The intuition is similar to as under unobservability. With reversibility,
c = 0 and a fisherman’s bycatch/harvest ratio depends on
(
1
φ − 1
)1−β
. With trade, a relatively
higher harvest is reaped by fishermen with high φ realizations by purchasing additional quotas.
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Figure 5: Cost increase and bycatch reduction under no trade scenario, and at-sea observability.
Results assume φ uniformly distributed on [0.7, 0.9] with w = pf = 1, zf = 2, zt = 0.1, β = 0.6 and
qf = 1.
Since these fishermen inflict a lower sea-turtle mortality, bycatch/harvest in the aggregate is lower
under trade.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a framework to study the design and performance of quota-based management
approaches in fisheries experiencing socially harmful bycatch of non-market species. Our model
combines endogenous and costly bycatch avoidance, and randomness in harvests of both the tar-
get and bycatch stocks. We incorporate our technology within a standard optimizing framework
to study fishing behavior and management performance with observable and unobservable at-sea
fishing activities, and with and without quota and bycatch permit trades. Empirical evidence from
the Gulf of Mexico longline reef fish fishery is presented to motivate our analysis and add context.
Our results suggest that, with trade in fish quotas and bycatch caps, but without at-sea observ-
ability, fishermen do not incur the cost of avoiding bycatch while conducting target-stock fishing
operations. Trading in bycatch permits is irrelevant. With trade in fish quotas, bycatch can be
controlled by the regulator only by reducing the fish quota and foregoing harvest of target fish
stock.
Bycatch observability introduces an incentive to undertake costly avoidance efforts, through the
introduction of a bycatch permit user cost. A bycatch management scheme with both observability
and frictionless quota/cap trading allows fishermen to match aggregate harvests with aggregate
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quota/cap for both the target and bycatch species, at lowest cost. Costs increase when quota/cap
is not freely traded. This is because fishermen allocate more inputs to guard against target-stock
harvest underages, while at the same time revenue in the fishery is lost without trade as some fish
stock quota remains unfished.
Overall, our results hold that efficient target stock/bycatch outcomes emerge under quota/cap
management when regulators are able to observe at-sea fishing activity, and if trades of target
stock quota and bycatch permits are frictionless. Trading frictions can be overcome with modern
communications technology. Achieving at-sea observability at reasonable cost appears possible with
recent advances in electronic video monitoring technology. Our assessment of the costs associated
with non-quota-based regulation under Amendment 31 suggest tradable bycatch caps should be
given serious consideration in the Gulf longline reef fish fishery, and in other fisheries facing smilar
bycatch problems.
The costs of non-quota-based bycatch regulations emerge as foregone harvests of valued target
stocks and/or higher harvesting costs. These costs can be substantial as evidence suggests in
the Gulf of Mexico longline reef fish fishery. If sea-turtle encounters are proportional to longline
fishing effort, licence reductions under Amendment 31 appear to address the goal of reducing turtle
bycatch. Assuming the 17.6% encounter rate is accurate and is unaffected by changes in fishing
behavior, post Amendment 31, roughly 104 fewer turtle encounters occurred in 2009 (see Table
1). Data limitations do not allow an assessment of the cost of attaining the same turtle bycatch
reduction under a tradable bycatch cap program. While empirical evidence suggests Amendment
31 regulations are costly in terms of foregone harvest and increased fishing costs, an important
advantage they offer is that at-sea fishing activity need not be monitored. The cost of placing an
observer on-board a longline reef fish vessel is estimated at $1,500 per day before administrative
costs (Perruso, 2012, personal communication). Since quota-based bycatch management would
require 100% observer coverage, the price tag for a longline fleet observer program would exceed
$1.86 million per year based on the 2008 days at sea.
Recent developments in electronic video monitoring technology on the other hand can provide
a viable alternative for implementing 100% observability (Lara-Lopez et al. 2010). The cost of
electronic equipment may be as low as $30 per vessel fishing day. Additional costs are incurred to
review video footage collected by on-board cameras. These costs could be kept in check through
a system of fisherman self-reporting and random auditing (Stanley et al., 2011). That is, fines for
miss-reporting bycatch coupled with random audits would likely be sufficient to ensure effective
monitoring and thus implementation of a cap-and-trade bycatch management program.
Comparing the costs of restricting bycatch below a particular target under quota- and non-quota-
based regulation can be difficult. With sufficient data, a structural model of a target-stock/sea
turtle bycatch technology could provide a more complete picture of the cost of reducing bycatch
under alternate regulations. Extensions of our model to consider multiple fish and bycatch species
and/or multiple production periods could provide additional insights for the design of cap-and-trade
bycatch policies. Our paper provides a useful starting point for further investigations.
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7 Appendix to “Cap and trade bycatch management with costly
avoidance and stock uncertainty”
7.1 Unobservable bycatch without trade in fish quotas
For all φ > φ¯, fishermen harvest on points between D and F such as A and C in Figure 2. Then,
φ−contingent turtle by-catch realization is given by
ht (φ) =
{
zt(1− φ)1−βnβ; φ < φ¯
zt(1− c)(1− φ)1−βnβ; φ > φ¯
which leads to (9) in the main text.
Referring back to Figure 2, for points such as A and C, c > 0. Its value is then determined as the
following:
zf (1− a(c))φ1−βnβ = qf ;
Leta (c) ≡ 1−
√
1− c2
2
= 1− qf
zfφ1−βnβ
;
⇒ c =
√
1−
(
2qf
zfφ1−βnβ
− 1
)2
.
7.2 Unobservable harvest/bycatch
With quota trade: It is useful to evaluate first:
E
(
φ1−β
)
=
1
2− β
φ2−βmax − φ2−βmin
φmax − φmin ;
E
(
(1− φ)1−β
)
=
1
2− β
(1− φmin)2−β − (1− φmin)2−β
φmax − φmin ;
The bycatch/harvest ratio, τ as defined in (4) then becomes
τ =
qt
qf
=
zt
zf
(1− φmin)2−β − (1− φmax)2−β
φ2−βmax − φ2−βmin
(18)
Under trade, the input choice and quota price are determined from (2) and (3) as:
n =
(
(2− β) φmax − φmin
φ2−βmax − φ2−βmin
qf
zf
) 1
β
; rf = pf − wn
βqf
1
Under area closure, φ ∼ U [θφmin + (1− θ)φmax, φmax]. Then (30a) yields
n =
[
2− β
θ1−β
qf
zf
θ (φmax − φmin)
φ2−βmax − (θφmin + (1− θ)φmax)2−β
] 1
β
Comparing input employment with and without closure then obtains (31) in the main text.
Without quota trade: Here, it is not possible to get a closed form solution for n. However, one
can get a non-linear equation to solve for n from (5) and (6) as:
w = β pf
∫ φ¯
φmin
zfφ
1−βnβ−1dG (φ)⇒ nβ−1 = w
β pf zf
(2− β) φmax − φmin
φ¯2−β − φ2−βmin
;
φ¯ ≡
(
qf
zfnβ
) 1
1−β
⇒ nβ−1 = w
β pf zf
(2− β) φmax − φmin(
qf
zfnβ
) 2−β
1−β − φ2−βmin
(19)
When the aggregate harvest/landing is fixed, qf and n must jointly solve the last expression above
and
He = L = qf
φmax − φ¯
φmax − φmin +
zfn
β
2− β
φ¯2−β − φ2−βmin
φmax − φmin , (20)
which follows from (7).
7.2.1 Example 1: Trade versus no-trade when bycatch is unobservable
Let φ be uniformly distributed over the support [φmin, φmax] with φmin = 0.7 and φmax = 0.9. Let
w = pf = 1; zf = 2, zt = 0.1; β = 0.6; qf = 1.
Unobservable bycatch, with quota trade: In Appendix 7.2, we show that
n =
(
(2− β) φmax − φmin
φ2−βmax − φ2−βmin
qf
zf
) 1
β
;rf = pf − wn
βqf
.
With parameters as detailed above, n = 0.366 and rf = 0.39. That is, the fish quota price is 39%
of the fish dockside price. Finally, τ equals 0.0284; i.e., turtle bycatch is 2.84% of the fish harvest.
Unobservable bycatch without quota trade: The derivation of n is presented in 7.2. It is
then straightforward to solve for the total fish harvest and turtle bycatch using (7) and (9). For
the parameters described above, n = 0.359, hef = 0.981, and h
e
t = 0.0276. That is, the input choice,
harvest, and bycatch are all below their values under quota trade. Here, trade in quotas increases
the return to inputs which in turn increase harvest and proportional bycatch.
2
Instead of keeping quota constant across the two trading environments, for a more meaningful
comparison we keep landings fixed. Under quota trade, this is obtained by simply setting qf equal
to the desired landing, whereas without quota trade qf and n for any given landing are jointly
determined from equations (19) and (20).
7.2.2 Example 2: Trade versus no-trade when bycatch is observable
Distributional assumptions and parameter values follow from Example 1.
Observable harvests/bycatch with trade in quotas: We first set the quota/cap thresholds
such that they bind in equilibrium. The idea is to restrict sea-turtle bycatch to a level below the
equilibrium bycatch when it is unobservable, and then examine how observability impacts input
choices and equilibrium outcomes. Fish quotas bind if it falls below
qˆf ≡ ( w
βpf
)
β
β−1
[
2− β
zf
φmax − φmin
φ2−βmax − φ2−βmin
] 1
β−1
. (21)
To check whether the cap on turtle bycatch binds, one needs to check whether
qt < τqf ,
where τ is given by (18) as under unobservable behavior. It is easily checked that for qf ∈ [0.7, 1]
and qt = 0.01, qf < qˆf and qt < τqf holds. It is then easily verified that fish quota price falls
while sea-turtle cap price rises as qf is raised from 0.7 to 1.
17 The converse also holds true. That
is, keeping fish quota fixed sea-turtle bycatch price declines while fish quota price rises as bycatch
cap is raised. The result is as expected because fish harvest and sea-turtle bycatch are output
complements.
7.3 Equilibrium when input is chosen after observing φ, i.e., equilibrium with
reversible inputs
In this alternative set up, it is assumed that every fisherman first gets an i.i.d. draw from G (φ) and
then makes his input choice. The equilibrium is identical to the case when inputs can be returned
to the port without any cost. Below we derive equilibrium expressions corresponding to the cases
undertaken (irreversible inputs) in the main text of the paper.
7.3.1 Unobservable bycatch with quota trade
All fisherman, as before, carry the same quota qf when they head out to sea.
18 Their φ -contingent
profits are
17See Singh and Weninger (2013) for details.
18Of course, they can all directly buy quotas from the management after realizing their φ. The result will be
identical.
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Π = (pf − rf )φ1−β · zf nβ − w n+ rfqf ,
An interior choice of n solves
β (pf − rf )φ1−β · zf nβ−1 = w ⇒ n = φ
(
β (pf − rf ) zf
w
) 1
1−β
(22)
Here, nφ is constant for everybody, whereas when input is chosen before observing φ (as in the main
text), it is n which is constant for everybody. After aggregating over the unit mass of fishermen,
in equilibrium
E
[
φ1−βnβ
]
· zf = qf ,
Quota price can be obtained by combining the above with (22):19
E (φ)
(
β (pf − rf ) zf
w
) β
1−β
=
qf
zf
⇒ rf = pf
1− w
βpfzf
q
1−β
β
f
φ¯
1−β
β

It is useful to compare the above with the expression for quota prices when inputs are chosen before
φ is realized. In the main text, it can be shown that
rf = pf
1− w
βpfzf
q
1−β
β
f
(E [φ1−β])
1
β

Since E
[
φ1−β
]
< φ¯1−β due to Jensen’s inequality, rf is lower when fishermen face uncertainty after
input employment. It does not come as a surprise. Naturally, if fishermen do not face uncertainty
the aggregate outcome is more efficient. Quota rents will be higher.
Turtle bycatch also follows from the choice of n discussed above
het = ztE
[
(1− φ)1−β nβ
]
= ztE
[
(1− φ)1−β φ
β
φ¯
]
qf
zf
instead of
19Alternatively, combining (25) and (23) gets
rf = pf
(
1− wE (n)
βpfqf
)
.
instead of
rf = pf
(
1− w n
βpfqf
)
.
as in the main text. Indeed, the interpretation of both equations is identical. Note that, in the latter, E (n) = n.
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het =
zt
zf
E
[
(1− φ)1−β
]
E [φ1−β]
qf
zf
For the example 3.1.3, turtle bycatch with φ− contingent choices give het to be 2.82% instead of
2.84%. Once again, this is solely due to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty w.r.t. the
optimal input choice.
7.3.2 Unobservable bycatch without quota trade
Here the profit maximization problem equates marginal revenue with the marginal cost, as long as
the optimal input choice does not exceed one’s quota qf :
βpfφ
1−β · zf nβ−1 = w ⇒ n = φ
(
w
zfβpf
) 1
β−1
The value of φ below which these choices are interior, denoted as φˆ, follows from
φˆ1−β · zf nβ = φˆzf
(
w
zfβpf
) β
β−1
= qf
Thus, φ-contingent fish harvests are:
hf =
 zfφ
(
w
zfβpf
) β
β−1
, if φ < φˆ ≡ qfzf
(
w
zfβpf
) β
1−β
qf , if φ ≥ φˆ
.
Obtaining aggregate fish harvest as well as sea-turtle bycatch is then straightforward.
hef = zf
(
w
zfβpf
) β
β−1
∫ φˆ
φmin
φdG (φ) +
(
1−G
[
φˆ
])
qf
het =
zt
zf
qf
[∫ φˆ
φmin
(
1− φ
φ
)1−β φ
φˆ
dG (φ) +
∫ φmax
φˆ
(
1− φ
φ
)1−β
dG (φ)
]
When input is chosen before observing φ, uncertainty-whether the quota will bind or not-depresses
input employment. Overall fish harvest as a result lies below the outstanding quota. When fish-
ermen choose inputs after observing φ, only those with sufficiently low φ harvest below the quota.
Overall, fish harvest is higher. In this context, it is useful to revisit Example 3.1.3 discussed in the
text. For the selected parameters, φˆ = 0.38. Since φmin = 0.7 > φˆ, all fishermen are individually
quota constrained; their choices are solely determined by their quota. As a result, the harvest,
individually as well as in the aggregate, exactly matches the outstanding quota.
Moreover, when inputs are chosen before observing φ, those with high φ harvest fish below their
maximum harvestable fish (because they can not take it to the port) and instead expend resources to
lower sea-turtle mortality. This margin is absent under input employment after observing φ. Thus,
sea-turtle mortality is higher under the specification referee prefers. For Example 3.1.3 discussed
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above, sea-turtle mortality is 2.76% of fish harvest in the paper. With the above specification, it
turns out to be 2.85%.
Finally, φˆ < φmin, each fisherman will utilize n depending on their φ realization, given by
qf = zfφ
1−βnβφ
Thus,
nφ =
(
qf
zfφ1−β
) 1
β
Turtle killings for each φ will be
htφ = zt (1− φ)1−β
(
qf
zfφ1−β
)
Aggregate turtle bycatch is
ht =
zt
zf
qfE
(1− φ)1−β
φ1−β
=
zt
zf
qfE
φβ (1− φ)1−β
φ
Thus, whether for turtle bycatch to be lower under trade requires:
E
φβ (1− φ)1−β
φ
> E
(
φβ (1− φ)β
φ¯
)
.
Note that
E
φβ (1− φ)1−β
φ
= E
[
φβ (1− φ)1−β
]
E
[
1
φ
]
+ Cov
[
φβ (1− φ)1−β , 1
φ
]
> E
(
φβ (1− φ)β
φ¯
)
+ Cov
[
(1− φ)1−β φβ, 1
φ
]
where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. Thus, turtle bycatch is unambiguously lower
under trade if the covariance term is positive. Recall that φ ≡ xfxf+xt . It is reasonable to assume
that φ >> 12 ; indeed, the higher it is the more likely is the covariance term positive. It is easily
checked that for φ ∈ [0.7, 0.9] and for all β < 0.75, (1− φ)1−β φβ is monotonically decreasing in.
The covariance term is positive and therefore, with reversible inputs, turtle bycatch is lower under
trade – in contrast to the case with irreversible inputs.
7.3.3 Observability and Trade
There is no quota/cap violation under observability irrespective of what stand one takes on the
timing of the resolution of uncertainty. Harvests and mortalities will just match the quotas and
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caps allocated by the management. The only difference will be in their market prices.
Indeed, working out the equilibrium fish harvest and sea-turtle mortality when n is φ-contingent
is relatively straightforward compared to the set up used in the paper. Since c is chosen after
observing φ, its choice is still given by20
a′ (c˜) =
rt
pf − rf
zt
zf
(
1
φ
− 1
)1−β
.
The optimal input choice is obtained by maximizing the expected profit, after observing φ:
n = φ
(
β
w
(
(pf − rf ) zf [1− a (c˜ (φ))]
−rtzt
(
1−φ
φ
)1−β
(1− c˜ (φ))
)) 1
1−β
,
where c˜ (φ) is obtained from the previous result. Finally, rf and rt are jointly determined from
hef = zfE
φ( β
w
(
(pf − rf ) zf [1− a (c˜ (φ))]
−rtzt
(
1−φ
φ
)1−β
(1− c˜ (φ))
)) β
1−β
 = qf ;
het = ztE
(1− φ)1−β φβ ( β
w
(
(pf − rf ) zf [1− a (c˜ (φ))]
−rtzt
(
1−φ
φ
)1−β
(1− c˜ (φ))
)) β
1−β
 = qt
To verify whether our conjecture is correct, let qf = 1 and qt = 2.8% of fish harvest, i.e., qt =
0.028. Quota prices under the paper’s specification {rf , rt} = {0.39, 0.14}, whereas under the
above alternative specification it is {rf , rt} = {0.18, 11.85} instead.
7.3.4 Observability without trade
With observability, quotas and caps can not be violated. In the absence of trade, everyone is
then constrained either by their bycatch cap or fish quota. Those with sufficiently high φ will be
constrained by qf while those with sufficiently low φ will be constrained by qt. However, as n is
chosen after observing φ, individual optimality commands that c = a (c) = 0. Clearly, in terms
of computing the equilibrium, this problem is much simpler than the one undertaken in the main
text. For example, in the context of Figure 5, φˆ can now be trivially computed as
zt
zf
(
1− φˆ
φˆ
)1−β
=
qt
qf
⇒ φˆ = 1
1 +
(
zf
zt
qt
qf
) 1
1−β
.
20For example, when a (c) =
1−
√
1−c2
2
, the above gets
c˜ (φ) =
√√√√√ 1
1 + 1
4
(
rtzt
(pf−rf )zf
(
1−φ
φ
)1−β)−2 .
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Then, fishermen’s choices follow
n =

(
qt
zt(1−φ)1−β
) 1
β
, for all φ ≤ φˆ(
qf
zfφ1−β
) 1
β
, for all φ ≥ φˆ
Aggregate fish harvest and sea-turtle mortality readily follows as
hef =
qt
zt
zf
∫ φˆ
φmin
(
φ
1− φ
)1−β
dG (φ) +
(
1−G
(
φˆ
))
qf ;
het = G
(
φˆ
)
qt +
qf
zf
zt
∫ φmax
φˆ
(
1− φ
φ
)1−β
dG (φ)
Clearly hef < qf and h
e
t < qt. To answer whether trade leads to a lower bycatch (in % of fish
harvest), we need to increase qf under no trade such that the aggregate fish harvest equals the
quota under trade. Increasing both qf and qt by the same factor does not alter φˆ. Thus, to ensure
that hef = 1 as under trade we reset {qf , qt} = {1.0686, 0.02992}. The remaining parameters are
the same. Then, we get het = 0.282 which is higher than under trade. Recall that aggregate
landing under both cases is the same, but under trade fishermen incur avoidance costs, which in
the aggregate leads to a lower turtle mortality.
Thus, with reversible inputs, trade reduces turtle bycatch irrespective of whether the bycatch is
observable or unobservable.
7.4 Equilibrium under perfect information with unobservable bycatch and trade
in fishing quotas
Here we assume that the managers, as well as fishermen, have perfect information on location-
specific relative abundances. We further assume that the congestion costs are sufficiently high so
that in equilibrium (through coordination or otherwise) fishermen spread their harvesting opera-
tions uniformly across various locations. As a result, one can identify an individual fisherman with
the specific fishing location and its relative stock abundance φ.
A fisherman heading to location φ then chooses inputs to maximize
(pf − rf ) θ1−βφ1−β · zf nβ − w n
where rf is the quota price for fish stock. The first order condition for the optimal choice of n is
β (pf − rf ) θ1−βφ1−β · zf nβ−1 = w.
which yields
n (φ) = φθ
[
β (pf − rf ) zf
w
] 1
1−β
We continue to assume that the fish quota binds. With trade in quotas no discards occur, and
8
therefore aggregate harvest equals outstanding quota:
hf = θ
1−β · zf
∫
φ
φ1−β n (φ)β dG (φ) = θ zf
[
β (pf − rf ) zf
w
] β
1−β
E [φ] = qf . (23)
In turn21
rf = pf − w
βzf
(
qf
zfθE (φ)
) 1−β
β
Clearly, the higher the qf , the lower is rf . We assume that qf < zfE (φ)
(
βzfpf
w
) β
1−β
, so that rf > 0
in equilibrium. Turtle bycatch is now given by
ht = θ
1−βzt
∫
φ
(1− φ)1−β · n (φ)β dG (φ) =
θ
[
β (pf − rf ) zf
w
] β
1−β
zt
∫
φ
(1− φ)1−β · φβdG (φ)
=
E
[
(1− φ)1−β · φβ
]
E (φ)
zt
zf︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ
qf
The bycatch ratio is
E[(1−φ)1−β]
E(φ1−β)
zt
zf
when φ is realized only after fishermen reach their fishing
locations. As one would expect, with ex-ante perfect information of location-specific relative abun-
dances, discards are also lower because
E
[
(1− φ)1−β φβ
]
E (φ)
<
E (1− φ)1−β E (φβ)
E (φ)
<
E (1− φ)1−β
(E (φ))1−β
<
E (1− φ)1−β
E (φ1−β)
Fishery wide harvesting costs are represented by aggregate amount of inputs employed∫
φ
n (φ) dG (φ) = E (φ) θ
[
β (pf − rf ) zf
w
] 1
1−β
= (θE (φ))
1− 1
β
(
qf
zf
) 1
β
,
where we have used (23) in the last step. A lower θ truncates the lower tail of the distribution
of φ and E (φ) is therefore larger. Whether inputs employed increase or decrease with θ is thus
ambiguous from the expression.
21Notice here that for each fisherman rf = pf− wnβhf holds, whereas for the case dealt in the main text rf = pf−
wn
βqf
holds. The latter no longer holds now.
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7.5 Input choice under observability and no quota/cap trade when {qf , qt} is
sufficiently tight
Using (16a) and (15b), the first order condition for maximizing pfh
e w.r.t n is
w
pf
= β
∫ φˆ
φmin
zf (1− a (cˆt (φ, qt, n)))φ1−βnβ−1dG (φ)
−
∫ φˆ
φmin
zfa
′ (cˆt (φ, qt, n))
∂cˆt (φ, qt, n)
∂n
φ1−βnβdG (φ) .
Using (14b), we obtain
∂cˆt (φ, qt, n)
∂n
= β
(1− c)nβ−1
nβ
,
which together with the previous expression obtains (17) in the main text.
7.6 Conditions for quotas/caps to bind under observability
To identify set of {qf , qt} that bind under observability, one has to first consider the case in which
there is no cap on turtle bycatch. Then, with trade, all fishermen harvest at their maximum fish
harvest point, i.e.,
hf = zfφ
1−βnβ;hef = zfn
β 1
2− β
φ2−βmax − φ2−βmin
φmax − φmin = qf . (24)
The input required for this to happen is given, in turn, as
n =
[
(2− β) qf
zf
φmax − φmin
φ2−βmax − φ2−βmin
] 1
β
. (25)
As long as the quota binds, i.e., rf > 0. The value of rf is obtained from
β (pf − rf ) zfnβ−1 1
2− β
φ2−βmax − φ2−βmin
φmax − φmin = w;
after using the value of n given by (25). There is a value of qf = qˆf such that rf = 0. This implies
that
βzfn
β 1
2− β
φ2−βmax − φ2−βmin
φmax − φmin =
wn
pf
(26)
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Combining (24), (25) and (26) obtains
βqˆf =
w
pf
[
(2− β) qˆf
zf
φmax − φmin
φ2−βmax − φ2−βmin
] 1
β
,
which gets equation (21) in the main text.
7.7 Equilibrium under observability and no quota trade when {qf , qt} falls out-
side the feasible harvest envelope
Consider a quota/cap {qf , qt} =
{
q′f , q
′
t
}
in Figure 5. Let two possible HBPF realizations corre-
sponding to φ and φ¯ (with φ¯ > φ) be as shown in Figure 5. Then φ¯ is as defined in (5) with qf
replaced by q′f . Then, for all φ > φ¯ the fisherman’s maximum feasible fish harvest exceeds his quota
q′f . Now, let φ ≡ 1−
(
q′t
ztnβ
) 1
1−β
as shown in Figure 5. Those fishermen for whom φ > φ have their
sea-turtle caps qt > zt (1− φ)1−β nβ. Conversely, for all φ < φ, the maximum fish harvest points
on the HBPF will violate the turtle bycatch cap.
Thus, for points such as B with {qf , qt} that lie outside the envelope of maximum harvest points,
notice that φ¯ > φ. This implies22
(
qf
zf
) 1
1−β
+
(
qt
zt
) 1
1−β
> n
β
1−β
The operations stage Then, as in (5):
hf (φ) =
{
zfφ
1−βnβ, if φ ∈ [φ, φ¯] ;
qf , if φ > φ¯.
(27)
On the other hand, for those with φ < φ, qt < zt (1− φ)1−β nβ. These fishermen can not land their
maximum fish harvest as they have to honor their bycatch cap: ht = qt. Their fish harvest for all
φ < φ is given by hˆf (qt, φ, n) from (15b). On the other hand, when φ > φ¯, hf = qf and turtle
bycatch is given by hˆt (qf , φ, n) as in (15a). Thus,
ht (φ) =

qt; φ < φ
zt (1− φ)1−β nβ; φ ≤ φ ≤ φ¯
hˆt (qf , φ, n) ; φ > φ¯
(28)
22However, one needs to keep in mind that n is endogenously determined. Thus the condition above can only be
checked after the equilibrium has been computed. If this condition is violated after computing the equilibrium, then
equilibrium under φ¯ < φ will have to be examined.
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The planning stage Using (27), the expected fish harvest is given as
hef = qf
(
1−G (φ¯))+ ∫ φ¯
φ
zfφ
1−βnβdG (φ) +
∫ φ
φmin
zf hˆf (qt, φ, n) dG (φ)
The profit maximization problem then determines n as
pf
 β ∫ φ¯φ zfφ1−βnβ−1dG (φ) +
β
∫ φ
φmin
zf {1− a (cˆt (φ, qt, n))− (1− cˆt (φ, qt, n)) a′ (cˆt (φ, qt, n))}φ1−βnβ−1dG (φ)
 = w
This equation has the same interpretation as (17) in the main text.
In the absence of trade, aggregate fish harvest falls below the quota. The expected turtle bycatch,
using (28), is given by
het = qtG
(
φ
)
+
∫ φ¯
φ
zt (1− φ)1−β nβdG (φ) +
∫ φmax
φ¯
hˆt (qf , φ, n) dG (φ)
7.8 Crew shares and fixed operating expenses
Table A1: Crew share model
Parm. Std. Err. Prob.
Constant -0.693 0.104 0.000
Own-Op. -0.719 0.018 0.000
Crew 0.149 0.036 0.000
Length -0.001 0.003 0.645
Crew × Length -0.003 0.001 0.000
Longline Gear -0.270 0.024 0.000
Table A.1 reports results of a parametric crew share model which takes the following form:
CPt
Rt
=
1
1 + exp(−ztγ) + εt,
where CPt is the payment to the captain and crew reported in the logbook record on trip t, Rt is
trip revenue, zt is a vector of control variables, γ is an unknown parameter vector and εt is a mean
zero disturbance. Conditioning variables a constant term, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
vessel skipper is also the owner of the vessel and zero otherwise; crew size; vessel length; crew time
vessel length; and an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the trip employs longline gear and zero
otherwise. The model is estimated with non-linear least squares regression with 16,376 observations.
All parameters except vessel length are statistically significant from zero at conventional levels. The
longline gear crew share of revenues tends to be smaller as the productivity of longline gear is larger
than on baseline vertical line gear trips.
Logbook records exhibit some inconsistency in the crew payment, e.g., some skippers who are also
the owners of the vessel do not report a crew share. The harvest cost estimates reported in Table
2 are derived from fitted crew costs.
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Table A2: Annual cost model
Parm. Std. Err. Prob.
Constant -3.412 0.899 0.000
ln(Length) 1.796 0.233 0.000
ln(Horse Power) 0.369 0.102 0.000
Days fished/365 0.288 0.055 0.000
Data on annual operating expenses are from a survey of conducted by the Southeast Fisheries
Science Center. Fixed operating expenses include expenditures on tackle, vessel repair and main-
tenance, boat dockage fees, insurance, office expenses, and other annual expenses. Conditioning
variables include the length and horse power of the vessel in natural logarithms and the days at sea
the vessel fished as a proportion of total available days in a year. Least squares regression was used
to fit 178 observations for the 2005-09 fishing seasons. Parameter estimates, estimated standard
errors, and p-values are reported in Table A.2. The model R-squared is 0.40. Annual expenses
increase with vessel length, horse power and days fishing during a season. Additional regressions
found that gear type and the year of fishing had no affect on fixed annual operating expenses.
8 Extension: Non-quota-based bycatch management
This section the implications of non-quota-based bycatch regulations using the model developed in
the main text. We consider reductions in fishing effort, spatial or temporal fishery closure policies,
and gear modification, which comprise Amendment 31 to the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Management
Plan.
8.1 Gear modifications
Gear modifications can affect the transformation relationships embedded in the multi-product har-
vest technology. Consider a fishery with a fixed landing target and with a market for trade in fish
quotas. There are two cases to examine. First, technical innovation may lead to new gear types
which lower bycatch/target stock harvest rates at all effort levels and under all stock conditions.
The costs of such innovations include research and development expenditures, and the cost of tech-
nology adoption for fishermen. In the context of our model, a superior technology implies a higher
zf and a higher
zf
zt
. A higher zf increases fish output and reduces input costs (see (3)); a higher
zf
zt
reduces bycatch (see (4)).
A more realistic possibility is that innovation alters the bycatch/target stock transformation relation
but at a cost of reduced harvest of the target stock.23 In this case, turtle bycatch is lower (again,
see (4)), but input costs required to attain a given fish harvest are higher (see (3)). An optimal gear
restriction will equate the marginal social benefits of bycatch reduction with the marginal increase
in costs incurred by fishermen in the aggregate.
23For example, turtle excluder devices used on shrimp trawl nets in the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery allow sea
turtles to escape capture and drowning, but also allow some escapement of the target shrimp species. Estimates of
the proportion of the shrimp lost with turtle excluder devices are in the range of 2%-7.25% of the shrimp catch (see
Mukherjee and Segerson 2011).
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8.2 Effort reduction
Amendment 31 reduces the number of longline gear permits in the commercial reef fish fishery.
Our analysis shows that when bycatch is unobserved, no effort to avoid bycatch is undertaken, i.e.,
c = 0. If fishermen have no opportunity to switch gear types, the effect of a reduction in longline
effort would be analogous to a reduction in fish quota in our framework. In practice, reef fish
fishermen are able to switch from longline to vertical line gear. We therefore re-examine the effect
of longline effort limits on turtle bycatch.
We assume the manager issues longline permits to a fraction λ < 1 of reef fish fishermen. The
remaining 1 − λ of the population, if they find it worthwhile, can land their quotas using vertical
line gear. Let
{
zlf , z
l
t
}
denote the productivity parameters for longline gear, and let
{
zvf , z
v
t
}
denote
the corresponding parameters for the vertical line gear. We assume
zlt
zlf
>
zvt
zvf
and zlf > z
v
f . That is,
bycatch as a percentage of fish harvest is lower with the vertical line gear, but it comes at the cost
of a reduced productivity in fish harvest.
Let nl and nv denote the quantity of input employed by the two gear types. Optimal choices follow
(2), and therefore,
nl = (
zlf
zvf
)
1
1−β nv. (29)
Longline fishermen with a higher fish productivity employ relatively more inputs. Indeed, with both
gear types in operation, longline fishermen employ more inputs and catch more fish and turtles on
average than when only longline gear is employed in the fishery (see (35) in Appendix 8.4).
When we keep the fish landing target under permit restrictions fixed at the level attained under
no restrictions, we are able to show (Appendix 8.4) that aggregate input costs increase by a gross
factor,
(λ+ (1− λ)(z
v
f
zlf
)
1
1−β )
− 1−β
β > 1,
because the term inside the bracket is less than unity with
zvf
zlf
< 1. Further, a more restrictive
permit regime (a lower λ) decreases the term inside the bracket, and, therefore, implies a higher
cost of meeting aggregate fish landings target. The lower is
zvf
zlf
, the higher is the cost of landing the
aggregate fish quota.
As intended, relative to their level under no gear restrictions, sea-turtle bycatch reduces by a gross
factor of (see Appendix 8.4)):
λ+ (1− λ)(z
v
t
zvf
/
zlt
zlf
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
(
zvf
zlf
)
1
1−β
λ+ (1− λ)( z
v
f
zlf
)
1
1−β
≤ 1
While the costs increase, a more restrictive permit regime (a lower λ) succeeds in reducing bycatch;
notice that for λ = 1, the above factor is unity, while with λ = 0, the above simply reduces to
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(
zvt
zvf
/
zlt
zlf
). For any λ < 1, it is evident that the lower the ratio
zvt
zvf
vis-a`-vis
zlt
zlf
the lower is bycatch
for the same amount of fish landing.
8.3 Spatial restrictions/closures
The final regulatory action under Amendment 31 involves a closure of a portion of the fishing ground
to longline fishing, This regulation can reduce bycatch if the areas that are closed to fishing have
high turtle abundance. If the manager does not have area-specific turtle-abundance information,
area closures will merely decrease the productivity of fishermen. To capture the effect of the
closure regulation we introduce an additional parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] which measures the portion of
the fishing ground that remains accessible to longline gear. A closure is reflected by θ < 1. The
closure-policy-modified technology can be written as
{hf , ht} = θ1−β
{
zlf φ
1−β, zlt(1− φ)1−β
}
nβ,
which makes clear the productivity cost of a closure policy. Closures can only increase costs by
decreasing productivity, and if the permissible landing remains the same, bycatch will not be
affected at all. This is clearly suboptimal.
If, however, the manager has accurate information of turtle abundant areas and closes them to fish-
ing, the effect of lower productivity is counterbalanced by concentrating harvesting into relatively
higher-fish-abundant areas. As a result, average relative fish/turtle encounter rates are raised,
thereby increasing average fish harvest per unit of bycatch. We continue to assume that fishermen
only know the distribution of relative abundance in the area that remains open; as in the previous
analysis, their actual values are realized only at sea. Later, we also examine the case where both
manager and fishermen have perfect information about site-specific relative abundance.
Suppose relatively high turtle-abundance fishing areas are closed, leaving any θ portion of fish-
ery open with the distribution of φ, truncated over [φ′min, φmax] with φ
′
min > φmin. With these
modifications, the analytical results derived in the previous sections continue to hold.
Through a numerical example below, we contrast costs and benefits of area closures in a fishery
with trade in the fish quota.24
8.3.1 Example 3
Let the area kept open by the manager be denoted by θ < 1, and assume that the area closure
truncates the lower tail of uniformly distributed φ from U [φmin, φmax] to,
U
θφmin + (1− θ)φmax︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡φ′min
, φmax
 .
24An extension to the case without trade in fish quotas is straightforward, and the message remains the same. We
leave it to the interested reader to work this out.
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Thus, φmax − φ′min = θ(φmax − φmin).
Sea-turtle bycatch under area closures With unobservable bycatch, no efforts are made to
avoid sea-turtles. Assuming that the fish quota binds, we have
hef = qf = θ
1−βE
[
φ1−β
]
zfn
β; (30a)
het = θ
1−βE
[
(1− φ)1−β
]
ztn
β =
E
[
(1− φ)1−β]
E [ φ1−β]
zt
zf
qf . (30b)
Compare (30b) with (4): the expressions are identical. However, under a closure, a truncation of
the lower tail of φ decreases E
[
(1− φ)1−β] and increases E [ φ1−β]. Therefore, as intended, turtle
bycatch is lower. Indeed, the more restrictive the closure (a lower θ), the higher is the minimum
and the average relative fish abundance, the lower is the turtle bycatch.
Input costs under area closures Bycatch under a closure declines. If input costs required to
harvest the fish quota could also be lowered, then a closure is clearly a dominant policy. It is not
clear from (30a), however, whether more or less inputs need to be employed to harvest qf under a
closure. A closure (i.e., θ < 1) will entail higher input costs if and only if (see Appendix 7.2):
θβ
1− (θµ+ (1− θ))2−β >
1
1− µ2−β , (31)
where µ ≡ φminφmax .25 Clearly, when φmin = 0, i.e., µ = 0, the above fails to hold, and some area
closure is optimal. There exists a θˆ ∈ (0, 1) that solves θˆβ + (1− θˆ)2−β = 1, and for all θ < θˆ, (31)
is satisfied.26 Thus, input costs begin to increase when a sufficiently large area is closed. This also
implies that the rents accruing on quotas fall since the quota price continues to follow rf = pf− wnβqf .
In general, if the relative fish abundance is not too low in any region of the fishery – a more
realistic scenario – µ is sufficiently large, and an area closure will require higher input employment
to maintain harvest of a fixed fish quota. For example, even for µ = 0.2, i.e., φmin = 0.2φmax the
condition (31) holds for all θ < 1.
In examples 1 and 2, we assumed [φmin, φmax] = [0.7, 0.9]. Then µ = 0.778. Input costs are higher
for all degrees of area closures. Figure 6 below exhibits the percent increase in input costs and the
percent decrease in sea-turtle bycatch as a function of area closures, maintaining a fixed harvest of
the target stock.
Not surprisingly, the more restrictive the area closure, the higher the input costs required to land
the fish quota. To determine the optimal size of the area closure, a manager has to thus weigh the
social benefits of bycatch reduction against an increase in costs incurred privately by fishermen.
25Note that the above only holds at equality when θ = 1, irrespective of the value of µ.
26By applying L’Hospital’s rule, it is easy to check that the LHS→∞ as θ → 0.
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Figure 6: Costs and benefits of area closures when only manager has perfect information
Area closures under perfect information It is worth pointing out that the costs of area
closures will increase if managers are not fully informed about the spatial distribution of the bycatch
and target stock. Above, we have assumed managers know, in advance, the relative abundance of
fish and turtles across regions of the fishery while fishermen do not. How do managers obtain this
superior knowledge? Some would argue, on the contrary, that it is the fishermen who are better
informed.
To address this asymmetry, below we assume that managers as well as fishermen have perfectly
symmetric information about area-specific relative abundance. The details of this case are provided
in an Appendix 7.4. Figure 7 below shows the cost-benefit trade-offs for the parameters used in
Example 3.
Indeed, with symmetric information, bycatch reduction is lower and input costs are higher, relative
to the case with asymmetric information. With perfect information, fishermen are already avoiding
areas with high turtle encounters, thus leading to lower reductions under closures. Furthermore,
with perfect information, fishermen employ inputs more efficiently, and closures turn out to be
costlier.
8.4 Limits on longline permits
Gear type specific input choices follow (2):
E
[
φ1−β
]
· zif
(
ni
)β−1
=
w
β (pf − rf ) ; i = l, v. (32)
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Figure 7: Costs and benefits of area closures under perfect information
which leads to equation (29) in the main text. Quota market clearing requires that
λE
[
φ1−β
]
· zlf
(
nl
)β
+ (1− λ)E
[
φ1−β
]
· zvf (nv)β = qf . (33)
which along with (32) and (29) obtains
qf =
w
β (pf − rf )
(
λnl + (1− λ)nv
)
=
w
β (pf − rf )n
l
λ+ (1− λ)(zvf
zvf
) 1
1−β
 (34)
Using the above with (32) then yields
nl =
(
qf
E [φ1−β] · zlf
) 1
β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
input employed when only longline gear is employed

1
λ+ (1− λ)
(
zvf
zvf
) 1
1−β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1

1
β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
; (35)
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Thus, inputs employed by longline gear under permit restrictions increase, and so does per longline
fisherman harvest and bycatch. Fishery-wide inputs employed for harvesting qf equals
λnl + (1− λ)nv
=
(
qf
E [φ1−β] · zlf
) 1
β λ+ (1− λ)
(
zvf
zlf
) 1
1−β
(
λ+ (1− λ)
(
zvf
zlf
) 1
1−β
) 1
β
=
(
qf
E [φ1−β] · zlf
) 1
β
λ+ (1− λ)(zvf
zlf
) 1
1−β

β−1
β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
Thus aggregate input costs increase under permit restrictions. Indeed, lower the longline permits,
i.e., λ, the higher is the input cost. Finally, aggregate sea-turtle bycatch is given by (using (34)
and (32))
het = λE
[
(1− φ)1−β
]
· zlf
(
nl
)β
+ (1− λ)E
[
(1− φ)1−β
]
· zvf (nv)β
= qf
E
[
(1− φ)1−β
]
E [φ1−β]
zlt
zlf︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bycatch when only longline gear

λ+ (1− λ)
(
zvt
zvf
/
zlt
zlf
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
(
zvf
zlf
) 1
1−β
λ+ (1− λ)
(
zvf
zlf
) 1
1−β

︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
,
which, obviously, is lower relative to the case when entire fishery is operated by longline fishermen.
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